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REVIEWS 
The United States and Arms Control: The Challenge of Leadership 
Allan S. Krass, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1997, ISBN 0-275-95947-3 
Although the pace of arms control has slowed since 1993, there has been some good news: The weapons reductions under START, 
the indefinite extension of  the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the  Russian and  U.S.  ratification  of  the  Chemical  Weapons 
Convention, and the agreement of the five nuclear weapons states to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) banning all 
nuclear tests. But beyond these bright spots there is a sense that both the Congress and the Duma have other agendas on their 
minds. Krass's book comes at a good time to help us sort our way through the reasons for inaction. 
The United States And Arms Control is organized around several themes: A history of arms control during 1946-86, developments 
since  1986,  the  U.S.  arms  control  bureaucracy  and  its  problems, costs  and benefits  of  implementing treaties,  persistent 
noncompliance problems, implications for the stability of existing arms control regimes, and prospects for new agreements. 
The first four decades of arms control treaties did not have on-site inspections (OSIs) but instead relied on national technical 
means, such as satellites, to determine compliance. The book covers all treaties, but for brevity we will  confine ourselves to 
nuclear strategic arms  treaties,  nuclear testing treaties, and the  NPT. Krass  emphasizes  the  implementation aspects  of  the 
treaties, a topic usually avoided because of its mind-bending complexity. 
First the strategic treaties: The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty paved the way for on-site inspections, allowing 
inspectors  to  be  more  intrusive.  As part  of  this  increased scrutiny,  the  criteria  for the  quality of  verification changed from 
"adequate" to "effective." During INF Treaty ratification, Ambassador Paul Nitze defined "effective" by stating: "...if the other side 
moves beyond the limits  of the Treaty in any military significant  way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to 
respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the violation." During the ratification of START, Secretary of 
State James Baker added "the verification regime should enable us to detect patterns of marginal violations that do not present 
immediate risk to the U.S. security." Of course, more verification can lead to more trust, leading to more verification, and so on. 
At some point  the U.S. and Russia must determine how much verification is enough. If one calculates "draw-down curves" to 
determine the survivable forces, it is clear that the U.S. nuclear force will survive. Nobody seriously disputes the invulnerability of 
the Trident force. 
But having cops on the beat  sets a tone for safer streets. In my opinion, the political  atmosphere pushes us towards overly 
complex verification regimes that dampen possibilities for further cuts. Krass's earlier book on verification nicely discusses this 
issue. There are wise verification measures and their are superfluous ones. An excellent one in the START treaty is the re-entry 
vehicle OSI. The idea of actually counting the number of warheads on SS-18s and Peacekeepers was and is a great breakthrough. 
If, indeed, we are to go to lower numbers of warheads, this will be the most important compliance tool. 
Nuclear Testing Treaties: The expensive Corrtex measurements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) allowed the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union to calibrate their opponent's test sites for tests at 150 kilotons. This act was more political than technical, 
since the charges of "likely violation" of the TTBT were known to be untrue by the seismologists  and others--a fact  that  the 
Reagan  policy  community didn't want to  believe.  With  the 1996 signing  of  the  CTBT at  the U.N.,  new  verification  and 
implementation  tasks will  need  to  be fulfilled.  Most  understand  that the CTBT is  both an  arms control  treaty and a 
non-proliferation treaty. But implementation will be difficult because of the requirement for 44 nations to ratify and because of 
the complex data gathering and analysis. Nonetheless, it is worth this hassle to strengthen the NPT regime, as many non-nuclear 
weapons states see the NPT regime favoring the five nuclear-weapons states. 
Nuclear Nonproliferation: The NPT was indefinitely renewed in 1995. As part of the bargain, the nuclear weapon states stated 
they will commit to the CTBT. These five nations also gave assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, 
which we now know has some possible exceptions for some actions against  some chemical  weapon states. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency cannot be blamed for the failure to detect Iraq's nuclear program since the IAEA inspectors were confined 
to declared sites. However, in the wake of the 1991 findings on Iraq, the IAEA has instituted challenge inspections, inspections of 
North Korean nuclear facilities, and environmental inspections looking for clues. All these new tasks, plus the increasing number 
of facilities in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, makes for a tight IAEA safeguards budget. The challenge will be to save 
money by shifting the more mundane inspection tasks to automated technology. 
The "Bureaucratic Evolution" of the U.S. arms control process: The wiring diagrams between the various U.S. leadership bureaus is 
complicated greatly by the many component parts of each agency. The dynamic seems "anti-synergistic," because the whole can 
be less than the sum of the parts. Of course, one needs "effective" verification, but the verifiers often raise arguments against a 
provision that goes beyond mere logic. By and large, the process is made up of good people, but then with a clever flip of the 
wrist the issue is stalled. Only with a hard-driving NSC that uses a science-court approach of hard-hitting questions and answers 
is there  going to  be a smoother and happier process. Krass lays out  the  internal  process  of data  exchanges, notifications, 
inspections, analysis, compliance decisions, and more. 
Estimated costs of arms control treaties: The General Accounting Office estimated inspection costs for the INF Treaty at $7.5 M, 
and for the two continuous perimeter-portal monitoring at Magna and Votkinsk at $12 M per year. These costs are trivial when 
considering that the former Soviet Union destroyed 1,846 missiles and the U.S. destroyed 846 missiles. These and other costs 
will ultimately add up to a billion dollars, and are certainly much less than the annual savings of more than $100 billion from 
lowered post-Cold-War defense budgets. 
I  found  this  book to  be  both  a  welcome  analysis  of  the  current crop of arms control treaties, and  some of the  troubled 
implementation areas that will  probably constrain arms control in the future. Only by getting into the pesky details  on treaty 
implementation can we learn to overcome the pitfalls  of the past. The book is  well  written, even lively for such a drab, but 
important subject. If The United States And Arms Control comes out in a paperback version, I will use it as a required text on 
arms control matters. If it remains expensive, I will assign it as library reading. 
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